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ART. VIII. — AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEAS.

THE American Republic is an unprecedented political organization. It has no parallel or exemplar in history. It is a new growth. It resembles, indeed, in numerous respects, former political organizations, but the resemblances are only or mainly in form, while the differences are in essence. Historically and externally it may be classed with other federal governments, with the Achaian League, with the Swiss and the Dutch Republics. But its genuine characteristics are omitted in any such comparison. It derives its peculiar quality, not from its Federal relations, not from its Republican form, but from what underlies and vivifies alike its Federalism and its Republicanism. It is not to be understood by the study of other states; in order to understand it, it must be studied from within and in itself.

It differs moreover from the intentions and expectations of those who have been called its founders. Neither Winthrop and his band of Pilgrim companions foresaw in their farthest vision the real nature of the commonwealth of which they planted the seed, nor did the framers of the Constitution of the United States fully comprehend the spirit which was to give vital energy and perpetuity to their work. Their wisdom did not devise the Republic as it existed or as it exists. They builded better than they knew; for their work was controlled by supreme forces of which they had imperfect cognizance, and their highest praise is that they wrought unconsciously in harmony with these forces, whose irresistible power would ere this have rent asunder any fabric not thus constructed.

Our commonwealth was never, in truth, founded; it is not the result of pre-eminently wise forecast, or the product of any ordaining will. It was not made by man; it is no discovery or invention, but a natural growth, the slow, undiscerned, unimagined result of the instincts, desires, and efforts of individuals united in a society under novel conditions, and controlled by laws which mastered the thoughts and actions of men.

The Republic has therefore naturally been a puzzle and a surprise to foreigners, and in some degree to ourselves. It has

continually baffled expectation, and turned prophecy to folly. In its progress it has seemed to be too good to be true, and to offer fairer promises than could be fulfilled; but every year has taught us — and no years have taught us with more assurance than these late years of war — that its best promise was not beyond fulfilment; that nothing was too good not to be expected from it; that the best hopes of man for men might here find their accomplishment; that there was neither failure nor disappointment in it; that a perfect commonwealth might here become a reality.

Every year has taught us — these last five years more than any others — that the crimes, the wrongs, the miseries which deface the ideal of our state, — the inherited errors of the past, the selfishness of materialism, the mass of ignorance, the corruption of politics, the atrocities of slavery, — that these and all else of evil in their train were capable of removal, were not natural and inherent results of our system, were excrescences upon it which might be, which in time would be, got rid of, so that the actual commonwealth should assume slowly, imperfectly always, but ever more and more nearly, the image of the ideal. From the height of our Pisgah we have beheld the promised land, not as in dream, but in actual vision, and the cloud of the Lord by day and His pillar of fire by night have led us on our way.

In spite of the evils which the United States share with all other political communities, in spite of mistakes and defects which have seemed to superficial or faithless observers indications of radical unsoundness and approaching decay, yet the rational convictions of more competent and deeper thinkers have continually come into closer accord with the instinctive confidence of the people — a confidence springing from experience of blessings — in the perpetual beneficent progress of the principles on which American institutions of government and of society are based, and in the excellence of the ideas which form the foundation of the commonwealth.

What, then, are these ideas and principles which have had the power, and still have it, to shape the political action of the American people? What is this new thing in practical politics which the American Republic exhibits? What consti-

tutes its difference from all preceding political organizations? This is the problem of our history, and that history will not be correctly interpreted unless the problem be satisfactorily solved.

The investigation of the political ideas original in America, so far at least as their practical embodiment in institutions of government is concerned, is an inquiry of the highest interest and importance. The true nature and legitimate operation of these ideas is the greatest question in the art and science of government; for the progress of democracy in America is a fact at once so great and so new, so far-reaching in its influences, so revolutionary not only of old theories, but of old systems, and the tendency of political communities throughout the civilized world is so plainly toward democracy in one form or another, that to understand what it is that has given to American institutions their specific character and excellence becomes more and more important, not only to the student and to the statesman, but also to the lover of mankind, to every one laboring for the advance of man.

The great distinction between the new political world and the old political world begins with the first serious attempts of our ancestors to colonize America, and especially with the religious, industrial colonies that landed at Plymouth and founded Boston. The dawn of modern political civilization first lighted up Massachusetts Bay. The colonies that settled the shores of New England were of a new kind, and they established the validity of an order of ideas in practical politics which had hitherto in the history of the world been relegated to the domain of theory, and which in their application have not yet been fully expounded, have not yet been completely expressed in any political creed, but have from 1620 to 1865 been operative, whether recognized or not, in all the political movements of the American people. It was the force of conditions over which these Pilgrim colonists had little control, combined with the tendency of those beliefs and instincts which animated their souls and impelled them to their hard undertaking, that led to this advance in the art of politics. Hitherto, in the history of colonizing enterprise, the colonists had gone out as a swarm of bees from the hive, carrying with them unchanged the insti-

tutions and the relations of the parent state. The Greek colonies were in form and system, in government and domestic and social order, but copies, as literal as was possible, of the cities of Greece from which they had come out. The military colonies of the Romans carried with them the military rule of Rome, acquiring no independence, but remaining Roman in thought and in deed, alike in Thrace, Illyria, or Britain. Rome was impressed on the soil by every step of the colonist's foot. Rome, her mark, was written over every land of which her children took possession.

Not so with the colonies of New England. The colonists still professed themselves and believed themselves to be good subjects of Old England; but they had left her of their own accord. They had come over the ocean and settled the wilderness under no direction from the authorities of England, with no aid from them,—at most with their God-speed, thankful as they may have been to get rid of so troublesome a crew. The expedition was of individuals united for conscience' sake. The colony had a moral rather than a political foundation, and out of this fact sprang the first historical application of the truth, that politics are a branch of ethics, and are subject to its laws. The fact that these New England colonies were colonies of individuals united for conscience' sake, had consequences that were wholly unanticipated. The colonists had really cut themselves off from all vital connection with the Old World, although they still remained in formal connection with it. They had left feudalism, or the right of might, embodied in institutions whose essence was the doctrine of privilege,—they had left Roman Catholicism, or the right of authority in matters of opinion,—behind them. They had cut loose from the two great stays of modern European civilization: they had swung off from the old moorings mossy with antiquated superstitions,—from the old moorings of priest and king and noble,—and they started in ignorant faith on a voyage of discovery. The guidance of Providence did not fail them. It led them to that New World which they were to make new indeed. Much of their work was unconsciously performed. They knew not fully the force of their own principles. For the right of might they substituted the right of man, for the right of authority

they substituted the right of independence, for king and priest and noble they substituted *the People*.

This was the natural, the necessary conclusion from the fact of deriving political arrangements and systems from moral principles. In morals man is man, never less and never more, independent, equal, just. It is only in politics divorced from morals that man becomes more or less than man,—baron or serf, lord or vilen, — dependent, privileged, unjust.

The *people* of the American religious industrial colonies was a new thing,—there had been no *people* of the kind before. The world had seen a Roman *plebs*, mediæval burgesses and villeins,—it had never yet seen a *people*. It behooves us to find an intelligible definition of this people, and to understand what we as Americans mean by the phrase; for it is on this that our idea of the state and of government in great part depends.

Not merely the notion of this people, but the thing itself, has been of slow but regular growth. It did not spring fully developed on the landing of the Pilgrims, but it grew with the growth of the Colonies, acquiring strength, consistency, and conscious force during the long period of Colonial dependency, nurtured alike by the internal struggles of the nascent state and by its contentions with those who claimed to exercise authority over it from abroad. The circumstances of Colonial life,—the border hardships, the perils of war with civilized and savage foes, the scattered settlements, each with its local government and institutions, the popular form and methods of most of the Colonial governments, the Church contests, the disputes between neighboring Colonies,—all tended to promote the development not only of strong individualism, but also of the habit of combined action in the community. The quality, moreover, of the early settlers, marked as it was by their general intelligence, their attention to education, their deep moral sense, impressed itself upon their descendants, and upon the mass of the inferior emigrants of the later periods of Colonial history. A community grew up here, original not only in its modes of life, but in its composition. New England was throughout the whole Colonial period the typical portion of the English dominion in America. She was the mother of ideas

and of states. But similar influences to those which gave her her leading position were at work in the other Colonies. The Revolution welded the Colonies together. It taught them their strength when united in a common cause. It revealed them to themselves. The Confederation showed them their weakness. And the Constitution which gave to the States a national unity, which changed the Colonies into the United States, which raised them to a power in the world, was the embodiment of the long lessons of Colonial experience, and the expression not only of a new system of government, but of those new political ideas which had sprung up and were flourishing on American soil. Its opening words are the grand declaration of the existence of a state such as the world had not known,—a state not imposed upon a people, but having its existence and authority solely from them. “We, the people of the United States, . . . do ordain.” *We, the people*,—and this people means a civilized community spontaneously organized to promote the general welfare, and actuated by the moral forces which civilization has ingrained in the habits of a race, and which are derived from the Divine order of the universe. *We, the people of the United States*, means not a political body forming a state, and organizing itself simply for the sake of establishing a frame of government, but a moral community, already organized and governed by moral principles. We unite primarily not to govern or to be governed, but we the people frame a government as an expedient by which to confirm the already established moral order and the general welfare of the community, and thus to secure the progress of civilization. Neither the geographical limits of the United States nor the government of the United States make us a nation; but we, the people constituting a nation, make the United States and frame a government for them.

Hitherto, in political speculation, the state has been regarded as something apart from the people, or as embracing the people as one only of its elements. It has been considered as an abstract of the governmental institutions and political organization of any given country. But in this democracy of the New World the people constitute the state, its limits are defined by those of their moral co-operation; and the Ameri-

can idea of the state includes potential independence of institutions of government. These institutions are inseparable accidents, not essential features in the body politic. Theoretically, at least, the people are not merely capable of self-government, but are self-governing. Such institutions of government as they frame for themselves are in the nature of conveniences, aids, and appliances, — are to promote their welfare, to advance civilization, — and have no inherent power, validity, or right in themselves, and no virtue but in so far as they are adapted to the ends for which they are established.

The idea of sovereignty, as derived from ancient and mediæval times, has no moral weight in America, and no practical relation to our politics. The use of the word in our political debates has been a fertile source of fallacies, and has led to confusion and obscurity of thought in regard to the true character of our government. The government is in no proper sense sovereign in its relation to the people. Its laws are imposed, its penalties are exacted, not in virtue of any original sovereignty existing in it, but purely in virtue of a derived authority. The States of the Union have no rights of sovereignty over the general government of the United States, and none in their domestic relations. The States are mere conveniences. They represent no moral entity; they are political contrivances; their local governments are ingenious expedients for facilitating the interests of the people; they have no rights inherent in themselves. The rights they possess are rights derived, not from any transmitted powers, not from any inherited privileges, not from any original title, but from the consentaneous action of the people. They are in themselves simply geographical divisions of the country, with limits arbitrarily fixed, and with institutions not independent of, but wholly dependent on, the will of their inhabitants, and of the nation of which those inhabitants form a part.

The idea of sovereignty as it exists in our American politics, the idea that has been so fertile of evil, and is still so powerful in its capacity for harm, is derived from prerevolutionary sanctions and opinions, — from royal colonial charters, — from the instincts of feudalism, not yet wholly extinguished in the New World. The notion of sovereignty residing in the States can

be maintained only by an appeal to an historical authority, against which the American Revolution was a successful conflict, and of which the American Constitution was the express denial.

So, too, the general government of the United States derives no rights from the past; it has no authority by inheritance. It is the fruit of revolution. In constituting it the people surrendered no natural rights; they had no power to surrender these if they would, nor to inspire it with any inherent sovereignty. They constituted it as an agency, as the guardian of specified interests, as the means by which they might secure certain definite ends. The government of the United States, and that of each separate State, is valid only by reason of a popular sanction. There is in the nature of society, philosophically considered, no right to govern residing in any person or class. Strictly speaking, there exists outside of the individual no right to govern him. All government is an expedient, and it is founded, not upon right, but upon the consideration of the interests of the community. The divine right of kings is the expression only of the doctrine of a right inherent in power, whether the power of brute force or of superior intelligence. In politics there is no such thing as a natural right. Natural rights exist only in morals, and inhere in the individual as a moral being. As a moral being every man has rights, which may be called divine, as inseparable from the spiritual nature implanted in him by the Creator. It is the fundamental principle of American politics that rights inhere only in man as man. There is no better statement of these rights than that in the Declaration of Independence: "All men are created equal; they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." Powers, then, belong to governments, not rights, except such secondary rights as have their origin in these powers. And these powers are not natural, but derived; powers the exercise of which is authorized by the consent of the governed. No natural sovereignty inheres in a government. The sovereignty of the Union means the powers given

to the government by the people. We, the people of the United States, in adopting a Constitution as the symbol and expression of our national unity, gave to the government which that Constitution defined the powers necessary to secure its own existence and perpetuity, — powers of control over all inferior and subordinate governments, powers over communities and individuals, — but neither did nor could implant in it any natural right of sovereignty.

This statement of the American idea of government needs to be carefully guarded, lest paradoxical conclusions be drawn from it. Such conclusions have, indeed, been drawn from it. We have had, for example, the theory of *no* government advanced and strenuously maintained by a school of imperfect thinkers, who have professed to derive it from the principle of the unlimited freedom of the individual. But, as we have said, institutions of government, though not essential features, are inseparable accidents of the body politic. However self-governed the individuals of a community may be, yet, owing to the diverse wills and the variety of interests of individuals, the community requires, and must always require, an external government to control those wills, and to regulate the pursuit of those interests in such a manner as to preserve the moral order, to secure the general welfare. The more highly moral and intelligent individuals become, the less will be the need of this external government; but it is impossible that man, constituted as he is, should always, even with the highest moral and intellectual cultivation, subject his will, his passions, and his desires to the interests of the community of which he is a part.

Under the American system, a main feature of which is the constant potential improvement of the individual, the functions of external government are reduced to their lowest point, and under this system the way is open for the realization of the most inspiring and most promising idea of modern Christian civilization, — the true brotherhood of man, in which man shall feel himself no longer an isolated individual, but shall find his completeness and perfection, his worth and his happiness, in the recognized relations of mutual dependence existing between himself and the community of which he forms an integral and essential part. Without the rest of mankind he is

poor, bare, solitary, and his own nature is incomplete. With them he is rich, completed, and capable of a spiritual development of which our present civilization affords but a faint and partial type.

The principles thus recognized as essentially American, the principles, namely, that politics are a subordinate branch of morals, — that the people are, properly speaking, the whole community united in moral relations, — that the state, politically speaking, derives its existence from the people, — and that the government is but a device, determined by considerations of expediency, for the attainment of certain ends, — are illustrated by a remarkable feature in our political system, which has not been hitherto sufficiently considered, although it is embodied in the actual functions and operations of our American commonwealth.

No discovery more fertile in the most important results was ever made in political science than that which the early settlers of New England slowly wrought out. They found out by long and varied experience, that in a moral community civilized order may exist without governmental institutions, — an order proceeding from spontaneous moral and industrial co-operation, the result of a sense of mutual dependence, from which is developed an intelligent respect for mutual rights and interests. In a country of scattered settlements, often wide apart, and in which there are no long-established institutions of government, the share of any regularly constituted government in the preservation of social order must of necessity be very small. It was so in the early days of the Colonies; it has remained so in portions of the United States to the present day. And this fact leads to the recognition of the truth, that a state founded, as ours is, on natural rights, and deriving its existence from the people, includes two controlling agencies, consisting on the one hand of a government instituted with forms and powers, and operating through organized legal and military authority, and on the other hand in the devices and arrangements adopted by the people, or growing up among them, for the preservation of the inherent good order of a well-disposed and intelligent community.

In such a community, moreover, the latter organization is

more essential and important than the former, as it is also the earlier in its exhibition. In European feudal politics the reverse is the case, what may be called the natural arrangements of men to preserve order in society being regarded as dependent on the government for their support and efficiency. The tendency to centralization in European countries at the present time is one of the marked indications and evidences of this view of the relations of these two agencies in the state. In American politics, on the contrary, the opposite view prevails, for the most part, both in theory and practice. The government is subordinate to the arrangements for preserving good order which can and do exist independently of it. It is made, supported, and changed by proceedings outside of its own limits, save in so far as the forms of those proceedings may be regulated by it; and, instead of originating the good order of the community, itself originates from that good order.

If this statement should appear extravagant, because in some degree the result of a novel analysis of the conditions of our society, its seeming extravagance may be removed by some further considerations. For it is, indeed, no merely vividly conceived, but unreal and Utopian, theory with which we are dealing, but a real fact, however as yet vaguely conceived, the nature of which is illustrated, not merely by historic proof and by the actual structure of American society, but also by the whole course of political action in America.

Our common notions of government and of the state are so much derived from the past, so much the offspring of a political philosophy drawn from the historic precedents of the Old World, or based upon fanciful speculations concerning the nature and origin of civil society, that it is difficult for us to understand the true conditions, relations, and meanings of American society and institutions. The governments of Europe are historic inheritances, with the moral supports of tradition, succession, and force. The government of the United States, on the contrary, is not an historic product, has not the sanction of transmitted authority or inherited forms. It is severed from the past, is the product of the fresh efforts of men striving to do the best for themselves, unimpeded by traditionary forms and authority. Cut off from historic succession, the ultimate source

of the authority that resides in it is, as we have said, in the people themselves, who establish it to supply the needs of a civilized community, and to secure what is expedient for it. And this community, this people, does not become, in establishing the government for itself, merely a part of the governmental organization, acting solely thereafter through legalized modes and forms, whether of popular election, of court of justice, of assemblies of legislation or other, but remains what it was before the government was established, an organization outside of, superior to, and potentially independent of it. It is the crowning and consummate merit of our system, indeed, that the government so admirably meets the wants which it was designed to supply, is so natural a product of our conditions and needs, that the fact of this double element in the state is very rarely recognized in actual experience. The governmental organization and the extra-governmental organization of the people work together generally with the most perfect harmony. And thus, though this extra-governmental organization is constantly in action, it has failed to receive the attention it deserves as a most important and characteristic portion of our political system.

Upon analysis it will be found to have two main functions ; — one, the conservation of civil order in cases over which the authority of the regularly constituted government does not extend, or which it is incapable of dealing with by reason either of the absence or inefficiency of its ministers ; the other, the conservation of the government itself through agencies and expedients fitted to set it in motion and keep it in action. Vigilance committees and lynch courts, names of ill-regard because of the abuses to which they are liable, but in fact significative of the rude processes by which justice is administered, however imperfectly, in what may be called a border community, are perhaps the most striking instances of the first of these two functions. These courts and committees are empowered by an authority which is no other than the moral sense of the community, and their work is to carry this moral sense or opinion into effect. The most obvious illustration of the second of these two functions — the conservation of the government itself — is afforded by primary meetings in our

towns and by party caucuses and conventions. As the end of vigilance committees is to carry public opinion into effect, so the end of these meetings and conventions is to give form and direction to public opinion, is to combine that opinion so as to make it efficient and the basis of action. In all this work the government has no part ; it is wholly extra-governmental, or, so to speak, preliminary to government, and is effected without interfering with, or, even in the most extreme cases, permanently impairing, such governmental authority as may have been truly instituted and established in the moral regard of the community. The difference between a mob and a vigilance committee is the difference between an assemblage for the purpose of overthrowing government and disturbing established order, and an assemblage for the purpose of supplying the need of government and of maintaining order. Where the government is fully established, the action of vigilance committees ceases ; but even where government is best and most completely constituted, the extra-governmental organization of the community still exists, ready, if need be, to supply deficiencies, or to maintain the regular procedures of the government. Like the government itself, the modes of its action are mere expedients, often clumsy and poor enough, but nevertheless it forms a most valuable part of our political system, as has been proved by many striking instances during the war, in which its operation has been constant, and in the highest degree important and beneficent.

The constant interaction of the moral order of society and of the governmental order maintains our whole political system constantly ductile and pliable. It is thus enabled to fit itself to every new exigency, it is not averse to necessary change, it unites in itself the two elements of consistency and mutability. It is essentially a system of adaptation. No new condition arises which it has not the power to meet, and no progress is made in which it does not take part.

A government thus subject to change in accordance with the needs and progress of the community, instead of being, as some political theorists have supposed, contrary to established order and opposed to a true conservatism, is directly the reverse. A government founded on this idea is the most

favorable to the preservation of order, and, beyond all others, conservative alike of essential principles and of the institutions conformed to them. In devising better and better governmental expedients, the real object of the American is to bring the government into truer conformity to its principles. He never loses sight of the fact that government is only a device founded on expediency ; and he keeps in mind that it possesses no intrinsic right to exist, and that it is always subject to the arbitration of the popular right of revolution.

The most vital fact of American politics, the great, and, historically considered, the new result that we have reached, is the establishment of a political system in which the government is subordinate to the moral order of a civilized community, — an order which rests on the acknowledgment of the rights of man, as expressed by the terms liberty, justice, and equality, and which is manifested and maintained by the regular operation and continuous development of these principles. It was because of their sense that these principles of moral order were called in question, and their predominance in our system endangered, that the loyal portion of the American people was roused to the great efforts and sacrifices of the late war of the Rebellion. In defence of these principles they felt that no effort could be too great, no sacrifice could be extreme. Without them life was little worth having. On their preservation depended all that was desirable or honorable in our political system, all that had been gained by its establishment for the nation and for mankind. The war waged for their preservation has given us a new sense of their worth, and a better understanding of the system of which they form the undisturbed and enduring foundation.

The excellence of that system, and its adaptation to the wants of a progressive community, spring from the fact that the ideas which it embodies are primarily moral ideas, and as such incapable of being improved upon, though capable of continually improved application in institutions, forms, and methods, according to the advance of mankind in moral culture and intelligence.

A moral idea never changes. It is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever, and in every region of the providence of

God. The application of the moral idea changes with every new condition of human life. Political and social institutions founded upon moral ideas, so far as they are conformed to the ideal from which they spring, partake of its eternity ; they are human devices vivified by the Divine breath, human expedients drawing their strength from the principles on which the universe itself stands sure.

In America politics are a nobler pursuit than elsewhere, because here alone is their moral origin so established, that the science of practical politics becomes the study of the application of ideal politics to human affairs.

The investigation in which we have been engaged, though of an abstract nature, has a very direct bearing upon the questions in practical politics which are now before the country, — questions remaining after the sharp decisions of war, to try our virtue, our courage, and our faith in our own principles, with new tests. The conflict is not yet over. It cannot be repeated too often, that this war was a war of ideas, and that, until one idea or the other has secured a settled triumph, there can be no real peace between the parties to the war. What the true American idea was, we have endeavored to show ; the opposite to this idea in every particular is that for which the South contended. And though the South has sullenly laid down its arms, beaten and dispirited, it has not laid down its hate. Its spirit is still set desperately against us. It still clings to and maintains the idea for which it fought so strenuously in the field. We have secured a territorial Union, we have secured a geographical unity of the States, but we have not secured as yet a moral Union, a civil unity ; we have the harder part of our task before us.

Having faith in the American system, knowing that it is the means by which civil order is best secured and advanced, — knowing it to be based upon moral principles of universal application, — we must not shrink from the conclusions to which our faith and knowledge lead us. In the struggle between this system and one vitally opposed to it at every point, we must use whatever means are necessary, not merely to subdue, but to destroy and utterly root out the hostile system. There is neither cruelty nor vindictiveness, neither malice nor passion,

in this. It is not only the conclusion of the calm reason, but the dictate of conscience. It is the claim of humanity upon us. Future generations appeal to us, not to desert the cause which is theirs even more than ours. Let no weariness prevail with us, and no cry of magnanimity deceive us. There is no need to urge us to magnanimity; for in maintaining our cause, we are in truth consulting the interests of our enemies, and in winning its triumph we are winning a victory in which they also shall hereafter rejoice.

The North is civilized, the South is uncivilized. One must take the likeness of the other. The interests of the strong civilized community must prevail; and in this case the interests, being those of general moral order, carry a pre-eminent right with them. The community possesses the right over an individual, or over any number of individuals, to do whatever is necessary to protect or maintain its moral organization. The moral order of society, its general welfare, is the object of the Constitution of our government, and its inspiring principle. Principles, not forms, are the true guides of nations; but happy it is when, as in our case, principles and forms are in harmony with each other.

Having power, we have also the right — and having the right, the duty lies upon us — to impose those conditions on the Southern people which are requisite for the preservation, continuance, and progress of the moral order of that community of which they and we form parts. And the conditions which we have to impose are not conditions of tyranny, but of liberty; not of injustice, but of justice. We have to insist on the establishment of freedom, — freedom from servitude for the slaves, freedom of thought, conscience, speech, and the press for the whole community. We have to insist on justice under the law, on the controlled and regular processes of moral and legal organizations, on the subjection of the passions of individuals, on the steady administration of equal laws. We have to insist on political equality for all men, on the removal of all arbitrary distinctions in defining the political privileges of individuals, on a perfect equality of men in their relation to the community as members of its political organization. We have to insist on the right of every man to be equal to any other

man. Strange it is to see conquerors compelling the conquered to take blessings at their hands! Strange, to behold victors claiming no right over the vanquished but to secure to them equal rights with themselves! Strange and happy sight, prophetic of far-reaching good and far-shining glory, to behold the masters of dominion consulting no selfish interests, knowing, indeed, no selfish interests, but in all arrangements, in all schemes, proposing only to extend the limits of the principles from which they have derived their power, and which are to them the sources of perennial happiness and strength! This is the subjugation of the South,—to reduce her from slavery to liberty, from injustice to justice, from oppressive privileges to equal rights and privileges, from barbarism to civilization. This is the restoration of the Union,—to restore the people of every section to peace that shall be inviolable, because founded on the principles which support the pillars of the universe, and to progress that shall be as continuous as the life of mankind.

ART. IX.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

- 1.—*Speeches of ANDREW JOHNSON, President of the United States. With a Biographical Introduction, by FRANK MOORE.* Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. 1865.

THIS book will not want for readers. It is announced as being “published with the sanction and consent of the President,” and as containing “full reports of all the important speeches made by him since his entrance into public life.” It contains, also, a “Biographical Introduction” by the editor,—of which the best that we can say is, that it is a tolerably good performance; any authentic account, however, of this sort, is interesting now, and we get from this one a pretty fair acquaintance with the main facts of the President’s life. Some valuable extracts from speeches which are not printed in the body of the book are given in this part of it; and, best of all, the report and full account of that remarkable address to the colored people of Nashville, in which the speaker rose to such a noble height of feeling, and dilated